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INSTITUTIONAL INTEGRITY AND RESPECT FOR
PRECEDENT: DO THEY FAVOR CONTINUED
ADHERENCE TO AN ABORTION RIGHT?
MICHAEL F. MOSES*
INTRODUCTION
This year marks the 40th anniversary of Roe v. Wade.1  In
1992, at roughly the midpoint of its forty-year history with abor-
tion, the Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey substantially modified Roe by a 7–2 vote.2
Four Justices would have overruled Roe altogether.3  In a joint
opinion, three other Justices rejected Roe’s conclusion that abor-
tion is a fundamental right, rejected Roe’s use of strict scrutiny,
rejected Roe’s trimester framework, and expressly overruled cases
that had used that framework to invalidate abortion statutes.4
The authors of the joint opinion nonetheless voted to retain the
rule, announced in Roe, forbidding a pre-viability ban on abor-
tion.5  Their retention of Roe’s viability rule was not based on a
conclusion that Roe was correctly decided as an initial matter (a
* Associate General Counsel, United States Conference of Catholic Bish-
ops.  J.D., 1983, University of Missouri at Kansas City School of Law; M.A., 1997,
The Catholic University of America; B.A., 1978, University of Notre Dame.  I
have participated in litigation and advocacy relating to abortion, including
some of the cases discussed in this article.  The views expressed here are not
necessarily those of the Conference or any of its member Bishops.  I am grateful
to Joseph Darrow, Richard Doerflinger, Clarke Forsythe, Paul Benjamin Linton,
and Mark Rienzi for comments on an earlier draft of this article.
1. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).  Reference in this article to the
“abortion right” is shorthand for the right to an abortion announced in Roe.  It
should not be taken as a concession that there is such a right.
2. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
3. Id. at 944 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by White, Scalia, and Thomas, JJ.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); id. at 979 (Scalia, J.,
joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White and Thomas, JJ., concurring in the judg-
ment in part and dissenting in part).
4. Id. at 873–76, 878, 881–83, 885.  The overruled cases were City of
Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983), and Thornburgh
v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
5. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (joint opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy and Sou-
ter, JJ.). Roe also forbids an abortion ban after viability when “necessary” to pre-
serve a woman’s life or “health.” Roe, 410 U.S. at 164–65.  The Court has never
clarified, and it has declined the invitation to clarify, what that means. See Voi-
novich v. Women’s Med. Prof’l Corp., 523 U.S. 1036 (1998) (denying petition
for certiorari); id. at 1036 (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari
541
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question on which they expressly and repeatedly reserved judg-
ment),6 but was said to rest on respect for precedent (stare decisis)
and the interest in preventing a loss of public confidence in the
judiciary.7
This article considers whether either consideration supports
continued adherence to an abortion right, whether at viability or
any other stage of pregnancy.
I. DOES THE SUPREME COURT’S TREATMENT OF ABORTION
CONSTITUTE A STABLE BODY OF PRECEDENT?
Two peculiarities mark the Casey joint opinion’s treatment of
stare decisis.
In the first place (and in tension with its lengthy treatment
of stare decisis), the authors of the joint opinion actually end up
rejecting much of Roe.  This inconsistency is compounded by the
fact that the parts of Roe that Casey retains depend upon the parts
it rejects.  Once abortion is abandoned as a fundamental right, as
Casey does,8 it logically ceases to receive substantive due process
protection.9 Casey thus left in place a conclusion (that there
exists a constitutionally-based abortion right), but set aside a pre-
and stating that the Court should clarify what post-viability abortion restrictions
are permissible under Casey).
6. Casey, 505 U.S. at 853, 861 (referring to the “reservations” and
“whatever degree of personal reluctance any of us may have” in reaffirming
Roe); id. at 869 (stating that a decision to overrule Roe “would address error, if
error there was,” without deciding whether Roe was erroneously decided); id. at
871 (“We do not need to say whether each of us, had we been Members of the
Court” when Roe was decided, “would have concluded, as the Roe Court did,
that [states may not] ban . . . abortions prior to viability . . . . The matter is not
before us in the first instance, and . . . we are satisfied that the immediate ques-
tion is not the soundness of Roe’s resolution of the issue, but the precedential
force that must be accorded to its holding.”).  While declining to say that Roe
was correctly decided, the joint opinion nonetheless devotes some attention to
whether and how Roe fits within the Court’s previous decisions on substantive
due process, id. at 846–53, a matter that I take up in Part II.
7. Id. at 854–70.
8. See id. at 878–79; id. at 954 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judg-
ment in part and dissenting in part) (commenting on the plurality’s rejection
of abortion as a fundamental right subject to strict scrutiny).
9. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (determining that
assistance in committing suicide should not receive substantive due process pro-
tection because it is not a fundamental right); Casey, 505 U.S. at 847 (stating
that “all fundamental rights comprised within the term liberty are protected by
the Federal Constitution from invasion by the States”) (quoting Whitney v. Cali-
fornia, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (concurring opinion)).  The Court also asks
whether the protected interest is “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty”
such that “neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.”  Gluck-
sberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
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mise essential to that conclusion (that abortion is a fundamental
right).
“As a general rule,” the Justices have told us, “the principle
of stare decisis directs [the Court] to adhere not only to the hold-
ings of [its] prior cases, but also to their explications of the gov-
erning rules of law.”10  Thus, in contrast to “the English system,
which historically has been limited to following the results or dis-
position” of a case, the American system of stare decisis is “based
on adherence to both the reasoning and the result of a case, and
not simply to the result alone.”11  By rejecting Roe’s fundamental-
rights rationale, Casey adheres to a result but abandons the rea-
sons for it, leaving the abortion right as a kind of Potemkin
village.
A second peculiarity in Casey’s use of stare decisis concerns
the identification of what precisely is to be upheld. Stare decisis
assumes the existence of stable precedent—otherwise there is
nothing to which one can accord stare decisis effect or, rather, one
is left to pick and choose among inconsistent precedent.  But on
what basis is one to make that selection?  If past decisions do not
line up, if they contradict one another, if they do not constitute a
coherent whole, then the question arises as to which decision is
normative and which is not.  The whole point of stare decisis is to
avoid an outcome in which a court adopts an entirely new stan-
dard each time it decides an issue.  That commendable purpose
is thwarted if what is asserted as precedent is, in fact, a series of
inconsistent decisions all vying with each other.  Admittedly
there is some refinement of constitutional law over time as courts
confront new issues and reconsider old ones.  But constitutional
interpretation never reaches the point of stability and predict-
ability that stare decisis envisions if it changes course with virtually
every new decision.
Yet instability and unpredictability are among the most sali-
ent characteristics of the Court’s abortion jurisprudence.  Those
Justices holding to a constitutional abortion right have not
agreed on matters as basic as its source, its scope, what rules gov-
ern its treatment, or how any given rule should be applied.  On
the contrary, the judicially-crafted rules on abortion have shifted,
often substantially, with virtually each new major case.  A rule
announced in one case is often ignored or supplanted without
explanation in the same case or in later cases.
10. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 668 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
11. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 692 (3d Cir.
1991) (emphasis added), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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A few examples, which follow, illustrate the point.
A. The Roe Case
Roe announced that the interest in maternal health did not
justify any regulation in the first trimester because abortion, the
Court claimed, was at that time safer than childbirth.12  Even if
one accepts the claim, the explanation plainly does not support
the conclusion.  “[J]ust because the State has a compelling inter-
est in ensuring maternal safety once an abortion may be more
dangerous than childbirth,” Justice O’Connor would later note,
“it simply does not follow that the State has no interest before
that point that justifies state regulation to ensure that first-trimes-
ter abortions are performed as safely as possible.”13  Barring all
first trimester safety regulations based on a finding that abortion
is safer than childbirth is like barring regulation of air travel
because it is safer than ground transportation.
In any event, the Court began violating the first-trimester
rule the very day, and in the very case, in which it was
announced. Roe indicated that the state, at any stage of preg-
nancy, could require that abortion be performed only by a
licensed physician.14  At the same time, Roe cited the qualifica-
tions and licensure of the abortion practitioner as examples of
what the state could permissibly regulate only after the first
trimester.15
Roe repeatedly described abortion not principally as a
woman’s decision, but rather as her doctor’s decision.16  Justice
Blackmun’s real motive in writing Roe, it was said, was “getting
the law off the backs of physicians.”17  Framing the issue this way
12. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163–64.
13. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 460
(1983) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
14. Roe, 410 U.S. at 165. Roe also indicated that an abortion practitioner
who “abuses the privilege of exercising proper medical judgment,” i.e., who
commits medical malpractice, at any stage of pregnancy, was subject to the
“usual remedies, judicial and intra-professional.” Roe, 410 U.S. at 166.  Judicial
remedies and professional discipline are, of course, forms of state regulation
designed to serve the patient’s health.
15. Id. at 163.
16. “[T]he abortion decision in all its aspects is inherently, and primarily,
a medical decision,” the Court wrote, “and basic responsibility for it must rest
with the physician.” Id. at 166.  “[T]he abortion decision and its effectuation
must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman’s attending physi-
cian.” Id. at 164.  It was the “attending physician, in consultation with his
patient,” who was “free to determine . . . that, in his medical judgment, the
patient’s pregnancy should be terminated.” Id. at 163.
17. George J. Annas, The Limits of Law at the Limits of Life: Lessons from
Cannibalism, Euthanasia, Abortion, and the Court-Ordered Killing of One Conjoined
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is perhaps what led Chief Justice Burger to conclude that the
majority, which he joined, had not endorsed abortion on
demand.18  The characterization of the abortion right in terms
primarily of the doctor—and only secondarily the woman—
would flip the other way in later cases.19
Roe was equivocal about the source of the abortion right.
The “right of privacy,” the Court wrote,
whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s
concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state
action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined,
in the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights to the peo-
ple, is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.20
Roe’s conclusion that abortion was founded in the Due Process
Clause relies upon decisions that are easily distinguishable from
abortion.21  Likewise, as a surgical procedure, abortion has little
to do with privacy.22  Medicine per se is not “private” in any consti-
tutionally meaningful way, nor is it immune from government
regulation.
B. The Doe Case
In Doe v. Bolton, decided the same day as Roe, the Court
struck down a Georgia statute requiring that abortions be per-
Twin to Save the Other, 33 CONN. L. REV. 1275, 1277 (2001).  In Roe, Justice Black-
mun, a former general counsel to the famed Mayo Clinic in Rochester, Minne-
sota, “seemed more concerned about preventing legislatures from interfering
with medical practice than about expanding the rights of women.” Id.  Justice
Ginsburg has made somewhat similar observations.  Ruth Bader Ginsburg, James
P. White Lecture on Legal Education, 40 IND. L. REV. 479, 489 (2007) (“Roe was
concerned as much about the freedom of doctors to practice their profession
without government interference as about a woman’s choice.”).
18. Roe, 410 U.S. at 207–08 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
19. See, e.g., City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416,
420 n.1 (1983) (stating that it is the woman herself who has “a fundamental
right to make the highly personal choice whether or not to terminate her preg-
nancy”), overruled by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992); City of Akron, 462 U.S. at 429–30 (Until the end of the first trimester, “a
pregnant woman must be permitted, in consultation with her physician, to
decide to have an abortion and to effectuate that decision ‘free of interference
by the State.’”) (emphasis added).  The physician’s role was merely to “assist[ ]
the woman in the decisionmaking process” and to “implement[ ] her decision
should she choose abortion.” Id. at 427 (emphasis added).
20. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
21. See infra notes 85–97 and accompanying text.
22. Cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (“Would we
allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale
signs of the use of contraceptives?”).
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formed only in accredited, licensed hospitals, and only after the
concurrence of two other examining physicians and a hospital
review committee.23 Roe noted that the Doe and Roe opinions
were “to be read together.”24
The Doe opinion, read alongside Roe, is inscrutable.  Though
Roe calls for a trifurcated analysis, the Court in Doe applied the
trimester rules either not at all or not in the manner Roe pre-
scribed. Doe concluded, for example, that Georgia had failed to
prove that “only the full resources of a licensed hospital” fur-
thered maternal health and, on that basis, struck down the hospi-
talization requirement “because it fails to exclude the first
trimester . . . .”25  Of course, if regulation to further maternal
health were permissible only after the first trimester, as Roe held,
one wonders why, as to the first trimester, such proof would have
even been relevant.  As applied to subsequent stages of preg-
nancy, Roe would seem to demand upholding the hospitalization
and other requirements because they seem at least “reasonably
related” to maternal health.  Yet all the requirements were struck
down in their entirety and without regard to the stage of preg-
nancy.  In striking down the requirement of committee review,
for example, the Court did not allude to the rule permitting reg-
ulation reasonably related to maternal health after the first tri-
mester.  The Court found that the two-physician concurrence
requirement had “no rational connection with a patient’s
needs,”26 but it seems obvious that second opinions have at least
a rational connection with patient health.  Thus, what the Court
said in Roe and what it did in Doe are irreconcilable.
C. The Danforth Case
In 1976, without reference to the trimester rules, the Court
upheld a Missouri law, applicable throughout pregnancy, requir-
ing informed consent and the maintenance of certain records.27
Thus, contrary to what Roe actually said, the Court in practice
permitted some regulation of abortion in the first trimester—but
under what standard remained unclear.  Justice O’Connor would
correctly read the case, Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, as “a
retreat from the position ostensibly adopted in Roe that the State
23. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
24. Roe, 410 U.S. at 165.
25. Doe, 410 U.S. at 195.
26. Id. at 199.
27. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
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had no compelling interest in regulation during the first trimes-
ter . . . .”28
The Danforth Court also struck down, in their entirety, laws
requiring spousal and parental consent.  In doing so, the Court
did not use the trimester test; instead it used a balancing test.  As
to spousal consent, the Court concluded that “[i]nasmuch as it is
the woman who physically bears the child and who is the more
directly and immediately affected by the pregnancy, as between
the two, the balance weighs in her favor.”29  As to parental con-
sent, the Court wrote that “[a]ny independent interest the par-
ent may have in the termination of the minor daughter’s
pregnancy is no more weighty than the right of privacy of the
competent minor mature enough to have become pregnant.”30
Thus with a single stroke, and without applying the rules previ-
ously announced in Roe, the Court removed any role on the part
of fathers and grandparents in the decision whether the lives of,
respectively, their unborn children and grandchildren, may be
deliberately ended.  That result is hard to square with court deci-
sions according constitutional protection to marital and familial
relationships.31
Finally, and again without reference to the trimester rules
announced in Roe, Danforth struck down a Missouri law that
banned a method of abortion known as saline amniocentesis
after the first trimester.32  Given the evidence of safer alternative
abortion procedures,33 it would seem beyond dispute that the
ban on this now-outdated abortion procedure was at least “rea-
sonably related” to maternal health.
D. The Akron Case
A decade after Roe, in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Repro-
ductive Health,34 the Court, without explanation, introduced mod-
ifications to the first and second trimester tests.
28. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 460 n.6
(1983) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
29. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 71.
30. Id. at 75.
31. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Griswold v. Connecti-
cut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535
(1942); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923).
32. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 75–79.
33. Id. at 76–77.
34. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983),
overruled by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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The Court made no attempt to deny, as earlier cases had,
that regulation was permissible during the first trimester.  The
Court conceded that such regulation is permissible, but only if it
(a) has “no significant impact” on the woman’s exercise of her
right to have an abortion and (b) is justified by “important state
health objectives.”35  The Court warned, however, that “even
these minor regulations” (i.e., regulations having no “significant”
impact) “may not interfere with physician-patient consultation or
with the woman’s choice between abortion and childbirth.”36
Again, as formulated, the rule was seemingly absolute: any inter-
ference with physician-patient dialogue or the woman’s choice,
no matter how slight, would render a regulation invalid during
the first trimester.  The Court did not explain the basis for the
modification, or even acknowledge that it was making a change.
A second change introduced by Akron concerned the test for
evaluating regulations applicable after the first trimester.  During
the second trimester, the Court wrote, a regulation must be “rea-
sonably relate[d]” to preserving maternal health (the standard
announced in Roe) and must not depart from “accepted medical
practice” during “a substantial portion of the second trimester.”37
The Court made no attempt to justify this departure from Roe.
The new test was plainly more rigorous than the mere rationality
review for second-trimester regulations adopted in Roe.  Indeed,
to say that regulations cannot depart from “accepted medical
practice” is to give the subject of the regulation a kind of veto
power over regulators, as it prevents government from requiring
physicians and other health care providers to do anything more
than, or different from, what they already do.
Having announced these new rules, the Court proceeded at
once to ignore them. Akron invalidated a requirement, applicable
through all stages of pregnancy, that the physician (as opposed
to someone else) provide the patient with information about the
risks of pregnancy and abortion, post-abortion care, and other
information relevant to whether to have an abortion.  “[M]uch, if
not all” of this information, the Court concluded, “could be
given by a qualified person assisting the physician.”38  There is no
“vital . . . need” for the physician personally to provide this infor-
mation, the Court concluded.39  As Justice O’Connor recognized
in her dissenting opinion, this begs the question whether the
physician-only requirement was reasonably related to important
35. City of Akron, 462 U.S. at 430.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 430–31, 434.
38. Id. at 445 n.37.
39. Id. at 448.
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state objectives, as it surely was.40  The state could reasonably
have concluded that a physician is in a better position than a non-
physician to provide a woman contemplating an abortion with
information about the procedure and to answer her questions.
Striking the requirement down seems at cross purposes with Roe,
especially given the latter’s concern about protecting the physi-
cian-patient relationship.41
The Court likewise struck down a requirement that abor-
tions after the first trimester be performed in hospitals.  That
requirement, as Justice O’Connor noted, is reasonably related to
protecting maternal health “under any normal understanding of
what ‘reasonably relates’ signifies,” but the majority had again
“fail[ed] to apply” that standard.42
E. The Thornburgh Case
By 1986, Chief Justice Warren Burger, who had joined the
majority in Roe based on his understanding that the decision per-
mitted abortion to be regulated for the purpose of advancing
important state interests, had had enough.  That year, in Thorn-
burgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,43 a
majority struck down a Pennsylvania law requiring that a woman
be informed of medical risks associated with abortion and of the
availability of state-funded alternatives. Thornburgh also struck
down a law requiring care of a viable child that survives an abor-
tion.  Dissenting, the Chief Justice observed that these laws serve
the state’s interest in protecting maternal health, ensuring
informed consent, and protecting a viable child—all plainly
within the state’s authority under Roe.44  If this is what Roe means,
the Chief Justice wrote, then “I agree we should reexamine
Roe.”45
40. See id. at 471 n.15 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court
“inexplicably refuses to determine” whether the informed consent requirement
“reasonably relates to legitimate state interests”) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
41. See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text.
42. City of Akron, 462 U.S. at 467 n.11 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
43. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747 (1983), overruled by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992).
44. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 782–85.
45. Id. at 785.
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F. The “Undue Burden” Test
Lest one think Casey brought resolution and calm to this sea
of confusion, consider the more recent innovations that Casey
introduced and the disunity it produced in the Court.
The Casey plurality endorsed a test, entirely novel to substan-
tive due process cases, in which a law was said to be unconstitu-
tional if it unduly burdened the choice whether to have an
abortion.46  But what sort of burden is “undue?”  That term, like
the term “unconstitutional,” seems more a conclusion than a test.
The authors of the joint opinion elaborate that a burden is
“undue” if it places a “substantial obstacle” on the abortion deci-
sion, but that seems to replace one general term with an equally
general one.47  It still does not get us close to understanding
what sort of burden is unconstitutional in a way that can be uni-
formly applied in subsequent cases.
Given the indeterminacy and malleability of the undue bur-
den test, it is not surprising that the Justices who authored the
plurality opinion in Casey were themselves unable to reach agree-
ment—indeed they were on opposite sides—when the Court
tried to apply that test in two later cases involving the constitu-
tionality of laws banning partial birth abortion (“PBA”).
The first case (“Carhart I”) struck down a Nebraska law
prohibiting PBA.48  The majority, joined by Justices O’Connor
and Souter, who had been in the Casey plurality, claimed its deci-
sion was a “straightforward” application of Casey.49  But Justice
Kennedy, the third member of the Casey plurality, concluded that
the Court had deviated from Casey.50
The second case (“Carhart II”) upheld a federal law banning
PBA.51  The majority, in an opinion authored by Justice Ken-
nedy, claimed it was following Casey.52  Justice Souter joined a
dissenting opinion, concluding that the majority had deviated
from Casey.53  (Justice O’Connor by this time had retired from
the Court.)
These cases, involving similar statutes but starkly different
results, illustrate the difficulty of applying Casey’s undue burden
46. Casey, 505 U.S. at 874–79.
47. Id. at 877.
48. Stenberg v. Carhart (Carhart I), 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
49. Id. at 938.
50. Id. at 956–79 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
51. Gonzales v. Carhart (Carhart II), 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
52. Id. at 145–46.
53. Id. at 169–71 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, JJ.,
dissenting).
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test, even on the part of those Justices who devised that test, and
raise questions about the test’s workability.
G. The Viability Rule
Casey reaffirmed Roe’s rule forbidding a ban on abortion per-
formed before viability, or after viability if undertaken for rea-
sons of maternal health.  Individual Justices, including a member
of Casey’s plurality, had previously concluded that drawing a con-
stitutional line at viability is entirely “arbitrary.”54  Viability, of
course, is not a legal or biological concept.  Viability simply
means the point at which an unborn child, given the present
state of medical technology, can live outside his or her mother’s
womb.  Thus, under Casey as under Roe, the unborn child’s legal
status, rather illogically, depends on the contemporaneous state
of medical technology.  But from the sheer accident of whether
medicine can or cannot prolong a child’s life, it does not follow
that the state has no interest in protecting his or her life before
that point.55  To date, the Court has given no reasoned explana-
tion for why it selected viability as the crucial line for determin-
ing when an abortion must be allowed.
H. The Role of Experts
Carhart I announced that if experts were divided about the
safety of an abortion procedure, then the government was consti-
tutionally forbidden to ban it.56  This rule cannot be derived
from Casey and is contrary to how the Court ordinarily treats gov-
ernment regulation.  In general, the government is not barred
from regulating drugs, the environment, or product safety simply
by virtue of the fact that experts disagree over the propriety and
effect of the regulation.  Were it otherwise, any industry could
avoid regulation simply by producing some experts to testify in its
favor.
Carhart II returned to the common sense notion that a legis-
lature’s hands are not tied by disagreement among experts.57  It
is precisely the function of government to evaluate competing
expert views and make regulatory decisions.  On this point, Car-
54. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 461
(1983) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 794 (1986) (White, J., dissenting).
55. See John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade,
82 YALE L.J. 920, 924 (1973) (Roe’s adoption of the viability rule “seems to mis-
take a definition for a syllogism”), quoted in Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 794–95
(White, J., dissenting).
56. Stenberg v. Carhart (Carhart I), 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
57. Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 124.
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hart II unmistakably overrules Carhart I, but without saying so
explicitly.58  The Carhart II dissenters correctly identify this
“undisguised conflict” between the two cases.59
I. The “Large Fraction” Test
The plurality in Casey struck down a spousal notice law
because, in its view, a “large fraction” of women seeking abor-
tions who did not wish to notify their husbands would be unduly
burdened by it.  The plurality gave no explanation for the source
of its “large fraction” test;60 nor did it explain, in the facial chal-
lenge presented, why the spousal notice law should not have
been upheld under the traditional rule for facial challenges.61
Carhart II did not resolve the long-unsettled question
whether facial challenges to abortion laws, to succeed, must sat-
isfy the “large fraction” test or the “no . . . circumstances” test.62
However, the majority in that case concluded that if the former is
the correct test, then the challenged law must be measured
against the entire universe of women for whom doctors propose to use the
banned procedure.63  The dissenters, by contrast, claimed that the
facial validity of any abortion law should be decided by looking
only at those women for whom the law poses a medical risk, thereby
presumably rendering facially unconstitutional an abortion law
that creates a medical risk for anyone.64  The majority and dis-
senting opinions in Carhart II are inconsistent with each other,
and neither is easy to square with Casey.  The Court to date has
58. Id.
59. Id. at 179.
60. In addition, it is not clear how large the fraction must be, or how one
would prove that some specified fraction of women were unduly burdened by
an abortion regulation.  Those problems seem inherent in the test. See Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 973 n.2 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (stating that the
joint opinion’s conclusion about how many women are “unduly burdened” by
the challenged spousal notification provision “is not based on any hard evi-
dence,” but on speculation, and that “reliance on such speculation is the neces-
sary result of adopting the undue burden standard”).
61. Under that rule, a facial challenge cannot succeed unless there is no
set of circumstances in which the challenged law can be constitutionally
applied.  United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).
62. Indeed, the Court said it “need not resolve” that question to decide
the case. Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 167.  Fifteen years earlier, the Court had like-
wise declined an invitation to consider the question.  Ada v. Guam Soc’y of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 506 U.S. 1011 (1992) (denying petition for certi-
orari); see id. at 1011 (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of petition and arguing
that the lower court should have applied the Salerno test).
63. Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 168.
64. Id. at 187–89.
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not settled which test applies, and has yet to agree on how the
various tests work.
To its credit, Carhart II concluded that the jurisprudential
rules that apply in every other context should apply in abortion
cases too.65  But the disclaimer is ironic.  Were the Court truly to
subject abortion to a set of generally applicable rules, it would
have to reject the abortion right altogether, as the next section
argues.  Invariably, the Court’s abortion decisions continue to
distort traditional rules, typically with no explanatory principle or
rationale as to when a particular rule should or should not apply.
In turn, this practice (one cannot call it a pattern because it is
precisely the absence of a pattern) renders the Court susceptible
to a charge that its opinions in abortion cases are, at bottom,
driven by desired results.  That the abortion right, from its incep-
tion, has wandered in new directions with each new case suggests
that Casey does not achieve the resolution the plurality sought.
II. WAS ROE CORRECTLY DECIDED AS AN INITIAL MATTER?
The question that Casey expressly declines to consider, but
that seems essential to any discussion of whether the Court
should continue to adhere to an abortion right, is whether Roe
was correctly decided as an initial matter.  In 1997, the Supreme
Court reiterated the applicable test for deciding whether a right
not enumerated in the constitutional text is constitutionally
protected:
Our established method of substantive-due-process analysis
has two primary features: First, we have regularly observed
that the Due Process Clause specially protects those funda-
mental rights and liberties which are, objectively, “deeply
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,” . . . and
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” such that
“neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacri-
ficed” . . . . Second, we have required in substantive-due-
process cases a “careful description” of the asserted funda-
mental liberty interest.66
Abortion fails this test. Roe attempted at some length to
prove that proscriptions on abortion were a “recent” develop-
ment in Western and American law,67 but subsequent scholar-
ship has demonstrated conclusively that acceptance of abortion is
not in any sense deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and tradi-
65. Id. at 153–54, 163–64.
66. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997) (citations
omitted).
67. Roe, 410 U.S. at 129, 140–41.
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tions.  The opposite is true: it is the prohibition of abortion that
has deep roots in English and American history.  Joseph Del-
lapenna has produced a comprehensive study of the law of abor-
tion in England and America from the beginning of the common
law to the present.68  He concludes that “[t]he tradition of treat-
ing abortion as a crime was unbroken through nearly 800 years
of English and American history until the ‘reform’ movement of
the later twentieth century.”69  Dellapenna cites several thir-
teenth and fourteenth century cases in which criminal charges
were brought against a defendant who had caused the death of a
woman’s unborn child, and none of the cited cases indicate any
deficiency in the charge based on the stage of pregnancy.70  One
case, decided around 1280, involved a child of about a month’s
gestation and of uncertain gender at the time of death.71  “Tell-
ingly,” Dellapenna writes, “none of the defendants made an issue
of the gestational age of the dead child.”72  Despite the sugges-
tion by some modern commentators that these early cases
involved crimes against the mother, “even the usually terse lan-
guage of the plea rolls demonstrates a focus on the unborn child
itself, with the child’s death repeatedly recited as the crime and
not treated as a mere incident to a crime against the mother.”73
Significantly, this was at a time when “even a serious battery of a
woman without her death would not have been indictable as a
felony.”74
During the subsequent reign of the first two Tudor kings
(1485–1547), there were at least ten prosecutions for abortion in
the ecclesiastical courts—courts whose authority, like that of
other courts at the time, was derived from the Crown.75  Eight of
those cases involved attempted abortion by ingesting a foreign
substance, “removing any doubt about whether such abortions
were included within the proscription of abortion already evi-
dent in the earlier cases . . . .”76  As early as 1505, records appear
68. JOSEPH W. DELLAPENNA, DISPELLING THE MYTHS OF ABORTION HISTORY
(2006).  Dellapenna builds on the work of Philip Rafferty and others. See PHILIP
A. RAFFERTY, ROE V. WADE: The Birth of a Constitutional Right (1993).
69. DELLAPENNA, supra note 68, at xii.
70. Id. at 135–41.
71. Id. at 140.  The case is Rex v. Code, JUST 1/789, m.17 (Hampshire
Eyre 1281).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 142.
74. Id. at 142–43.
75. Id. at 176; see also id. at 170 (concerning the derivation of the courts’
authority).
76. Id. at 176.
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of a common law proceeding based on a voluntary ingestion
abortion.77
“There is little room to doubt,” Dellapenna continues, “that
after 1563, if not before, the law courts took primary responsibil-
ity for abortions of all types and that abortion was unequivocally
treated as a crime in the law courts.”78  A case involving voluntary
abortion through ingestion of poison, decided toward the end of
Elizabeth I’s reign, belies the notion that abortion was only a
crime when non-consensual.79  After Elizabeth’s death, “English
courts prosecuted abortions fairly routinely under the early
Stuarts, Cromwell’s Commonwealth, and the Restoration.”80
“[B]y the close of the seventeenth century, the criminality of
abortion under the common law was well established.  Courts
had rendered clear holdings that abortion was a crime, no deci-
sion indicated that any form of abortion was lawful, and secon-
dary authorities similarly uniformly supported the criminality of
abortion.”81
Dellapenna identifies a similar tradition in America begin-
ning with colonial times and closing with Roe in the late twentieth
century.  After identifying several criminal prosecutions for abor-
tion in the American colonies, he concludes that “the English law
regarding abortion was fully received in the colonies,”82 and that
“[a]ny supposed ‘common law liberty of abortion’ is as mythical
on this side of the Atlantic as on the other side.”83  By the early
nineteenth century, state legislatures, like Parliament, had begun
codifying these restrictions.84
If, as Dellapenna’s research demonstrates, abortion is not
grounded in history and tradition—which is essential if it is to
qualify for substantive due process protection—can it somehow
be shoehorned into the Constitution by likening it to other per-
77. Id. at 177–78.  The case is Lex v. Lichefeld, K.B. 27/974, Rex m.4
(1505).
78. Id. at 183.
79. Id. at 193.  The case is Regina v. Webb, ASSI 35/44/7 m.18 (1602), in
SURREY INDICTMENTS, Eliz. I, at 512 (no. 3146) (J. Cockburn ed. 1980).
80. DELLAPENNA, supra note 68, at 194 & nn. 84–86, and cases cited
therein.
81. Id. at 200.
82. Id. at 228.
83. Id. at 220.
84. Id. at 266, 268–303; see also Paul Benjamin Linton, Planned
Parenthood v. Casey: The Flight from Reason in the Supreme Court, 13 ST. LOUIS U.
PUB. L. REV. 15, 107–108 (1993) (compiling antebellum American statutes ban-
ning abortion).  Also mistaken is Roe’s assertion that nineteenth century statutes
banning abortion were intended to protect maternal health rather than protect
prenatal life. Id. at 109–19.
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sonal decisions that have been accorded constitutional protec-
tion under the Due Process Clause? Roe attempted to do that.  It
compared abortion to decisions regarding marriage and
parenthood that have long been held to enjoy constitutional pro-
tection.85  But the analogy overlooks obvious and critical differ-
ences between those decisions and the decision to have an
abortion. Roe itself conceded that the situation of the pregnant
woman “is inherently different from marital intimacy, or bed-
room possession of obscene material, or marriage, or procrea-
tion, or education” with which the Court’s earlier decisions had
been concerned.86  Moreover, by fashioning an abortion right
that can be exercised unilaterally on the part of the mother, Roe
undermines the very marital and familial rights upon which that
decision purported to be based.
Today, under Casey, a woman’s husband has no right to par-
ticipate in, or even be informed of, her decision to abort their
unborn child—and legislation requiring such notice, the Court
has indicated, cannot pass constitutional muster.87  Likewise, any
right parents may have to participate in, or even be informed of,
health care decisions regarding their minor daughter essentially
disappears once the issue turns to abortion.  In a series of cases
decided after Roe, the Court has insisted that minors be given the
opportunity to secure judicial approval instead of parental involve-
ment, a result that seems to assume that government is in a bet-
ter position than a girl’s own parents to counsel and aid her.88
Thus, far from bearing any kinship to recognized constitutional
protections for marriage and family, Roe positively erodes marital
and familial interests that are themselves deeply rooted in Ameri-
can history and tradition.89
85. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–53 (1973).
86. Id. at 159.  The fundamental right to bear children upon which the
Court relied is, of course, diametrically opposed to the right to destroy one’s
child, born or unborn.  For example, Roe is a universe away from the Court’s
past invalidation of state involuntary sterilization laws, declaring that
“[m]arriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival
of the race.”  Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
87. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 887–98 (1992).
88. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (plurality opinion); Bel-
lotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976).
89. These are not the only legal anomalies created by the abortion right.
Certain types of abortion, such as those based on the unborn child’s sex or
disability, seem in tension with the law’s treatment elsewhere of discrimination
based on gender and disability. See generally United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S.
515 (1996); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973).  The right of
abortion has also had a racially disparate effect. See The National Impact, TOO
MANY ABORTED, http://www.toomanyaborted.com/truth-in-black-and-white/
the-national-impact/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2013) (noting that African-Americans
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Marital and familial interests are not the only areas of consti-
tutional law in which Roe has had a corrosive effect.  The right
announced in Roe and reaffirmed in Casey has become a vehicle
for upsetting traditional protections for conscience and even the
right to life of born persons.  If the debate once concerned a
woman’s “choice” whether to have an abortion, it has now
become, in the rhetoric of the abortion industry, about an enti-
tlement to “access.”90  Over the decades, pressure to choose to
perform or fund abortion has led, as a necessary rear-guard
action, to the enactment of laws to protect the rights of govern-
ments, individuals, and organizations to choose not to participate
in or pay for abortion,91 but the pressure to participate in abor-
tion has not abated.92 Casey’s unusually expansive statement
about a “right to define one’s own concept of existence, of mean-
ing, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life” has been
cited as an authority for other “personal” decisions that fall wide
of any historical marker, including aid in committing suicide.93
Can Roe be defended by characterizing abortion as inherent
in the right to “bear or beget a child”?94 That phrase originates
in cases in which the government prevented people from having
children95 or interfered with the decision not to become preg-
nant,96 which is different from protecting an unborn child in an
established pregnancy.  Moreover, the phrase “bear and beget a
child” does not satisfy the need, emphasized in Glucksberg, for a
careful description of the conduct for which constitutional pro-
tection is sought.  On this point, Glucksberg itself is illustrative.
Proponents of a constitutional right to assisted suicide had char-
acterized suicide as the right to determine “the time and manner
of one’s death,” the right to “die,” the right to “choose how to
die,” the right to “control . . . one’s final days,” and the right “to
represent about 12.2% of the U.S. population, but account for 30% of all abor-
tions nationwide) (citing Facts on Induced Abortion in the United States,
GUTTMACHER INST., http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/fb_induced_abortion.
html#6) (last visisted Apr. 8, 2013).
90. See, e.g., Maureen Kramlich, The Abortion Debate Thirty Years Later: From
Choice to Coercion, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 783 (2004).
91. See, e.g., Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112–74,
§ 507(d), 125 Stat. 786, 1111–12 (2012) (forbidding government discrimina-
tion against individual and institutional health care entities on the basis that
they do not provide, refer for, or pay for abortions).
92. See, e.g., Cenzon-DeCarlo v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 626 F.3d 695 (2d Cir.
2010).
93. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 813 (9th Cir. 1996),
rev’d, Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
94. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
95. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
96. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
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choose a humane, dignified death.”97  The Court rejected all
such rhetorical sleight of hand, insisting on a careful description
of the conduct at issue.
One last factor animating Roe warrants extended considera-
tion because it has been a subject of much commentary. Roe con-
cluded that requiring a pregnant woman to carry her child to
term could have detrimental consequences for the woman.
Devoting no more than a single paragraph to this issue, the
Court wrote:
Specific and direct harm medically diagnosable even in
early pregnancy may be involved.  Maternity, or additional
offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful life and
future.  Psychological harm may be imminent.  Mental and
physical health may be taxed by child care.  There is also
the distress, for all concerned, associated with the
unwanted child, and there is the problem of bringing a
child into a family already unable, psychologically and oth-
erwise, to care for it.  In other cases, as in this one, the
additional difficulties and continuing stigma of unwed
motherhood may be involved.  All these are factors the
woman and her responsible physician necessarily will con-
sider in consultation.98
Given the lack of historical grounding for the abortion right,
one wonders why the burdens described in this passage are not,
in the first instance, legislative rather than constitutional ques-
tions.  In any event, the quoted passage is remarkable for many
reasons.  First, it is clear that the Court conflated two distinct sets
of consequences—one dealing with pregnancy and childbirth,
the other with parenting.99  The Court made no attempt to dis-
tinguish these sets of consequences from each other, to deter-
mine how often any particular detrimental consequence actually
occurs or with what degree of severity, or to determine what
other outcomes, positive or negative, may be associated with
them.  Second, the Court did not explore whether alternative
means exist to prevent or ameliorate the problems it identified.
Third, the Court did not consider whether abortion itself might
have negative consequences or create problems of a larger
97. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 722 (citations omitted).
98. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
99. Casey makes similar but abbreviated references to burdens associated
with pregnancy and parenting.  505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992) (“The mother who
carries a child to full term is subject to anxieties, to physical constraints, to pain
that only she must bear.”); id. at 853 (referring to “the inability to provide for
the nurture and care of the infant” as a “cruelty to the child and an anguish to
the parent”).
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dimension than the ones it was claimed to solve.  Fourth and
most strikingly, the Court cited no evidence upon which to draw
any conclusion as to any claimed burden, whether arising from
pregnancy, childbirth, or parenting.  The Court’s one-paragraph
assessment in this regard is entirely conclusory and speculative.
Fifth, the Court does not explain why the risk of an adverse con-
sequence should justify the much broader right to take the life of
the unborn child for any reason (whether related to maternal
health or not) before viability.
There is no logical relationship between the adverse conse-
quences the Court claimed for pregnancy, childbirth, and
parenting, and the broad right to abortion it fashioned in Roe.
On the contrary, as taken up in the next two sections, there are
fundamental disparities between the right announced in Roe and
the burdens upon which that right is ostensibly based.
A. Pregnancy and Childbirth
Roe devotes one sentence to the burdens associated with
pregnancy and childbirth.  The Court states, without elaboration
or citation of authority, only that “[s]pecific and direct harm
medically diagnosable even in early pregnancy may be
involved.”100  If maternal health gave rise to an abortion right,
then the right would necessarily be limited to the very few cases
in which abortion is done for medical reasons.101  Reliance upon
maternal health risks is inconsistent with the broad abortion
right announced in Roe under which an abortion may be
obtained before viability for any reason, not just for reasons of
maternal health.
In addition, maternal health problems associated with preg-
nancy and childbirth are generally manageable today by means
other than termination of a pregnancy,102 and any claim about
such problems must be viewed in light of evidence, generally
unknown at the time Roe was decided, concerning the maternal
health risks associated with abortion.  Today there is a significant
100. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
101. Maternal health is rarely the reason for an abortion.  Lawrence B.
Finer et al., Reasons U.S. Women Have Abortions: Quantitative and Qualitative Per-
spectives, 37 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 110, 112, 114 (2005) (report-
ing that women cited concerns about their own health as a reason for abortion
in only 12% of cases and as the most important reason in only 4%).
102. OBSTETRIC & GYNECOLOGIC EMERGENCIES xi (Mark D. Pearlman et al.
eds., 2004) (“Medical conditions that were formerly thought to be incompatible
with pregnancy . . . can be managed with successful outcomes.  These condi-
tions include disorders such as sickle cell anemia, cancer after chemotherapy
treatment, end-stage renal failure, organ transplantation, and cystic fibrosis.”).
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body of medical literature linking abortion to serious short- and
long-term physical and mental health risks.  Immediate complica-
tions include hemorrhage, uterine perforation, cervical lacera-
tions, and complications of anesthesia.103  Long-term
complications include placenta previa and pre-term delivery in
subsequent pregnancies.104  One authority identifies forty-nine
studies that have demonstrated a statistically significant increase
in premature births or low birth weight in subsequent
pregnancies in women with prior induced abortions, a risk that
increases with the number of prior induced abortions.105  The
plausibility of Roe’s assumption that abortion is safer than child-
birth has likewise been drawn into serious question.106
B. Parenting
Roe devotes a mere five sentences to the burdens of parent-
ing.107  It says nothing about any benefit.  What it says about
parenting burdens could be applied equally to men as to women.
Of course, outside of adoption proceedings, in which legal
responsibility for a child is shifted from birth parents to adoptive
parents, neither birth parent—be it mother or father—has any
103. ELIZABETH RING-CASSIDY & IAN GENTLES, WOMEN’S HEALTH AFTER
ABORTION: THE MEDICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EVIDENCE 2 (2d ed. 2003); Royal
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, The Care of Women Requesting Induced
Abortion: Evidence-based Clinical Guideline No. 7, 29 (Sept. 2004), available at
http://www.rcog.org.uk/womens-health/clinical-guidance/care-women-
requesting-induced-abortion.
104. John M. Thorp, Jr. et al., Long-Term Physical and Psychological Conse-
quences of Induced Abortion: Review of the Evidence, 58 OBSTETRICAL & GYNECOLOGI-
CAL SURVEY 67, 70–72, 75 (2002); Elizabeth M. Shadigian, Reviewing the Evidence,
Breaking the Silence: Long-Term Physical and Psychological Health Consequences of
Induced Abortion, in THE COST OF “CHOICE” 63, 67–68 (Erika Bachiochi ed.,
2004).
105. Brent Rooney & Byron C. Calhoun, Induced Abortion and Risk of Later
Premature Births, 8 J. AM. PHYSICIANS & SURGEONS 46, 46 (2003).  Low birth
weight and premature birth “are the most important risk factors for infant mor-
tality or later disabilities as well as for lower cognitive abilities and greater
behavioral problems . . . .” Id.; see also Bryon C. Calhoun, Elizabeth Shadigian &
Brent Rooney, Cost Consequences of Induced Abortion as an Attributable Risk for
Preterm Birth and Impact on Informed Consent, 52 J. REPROD. MED. 929 (2007) (find-
ing, based on a review of existing literature, that induced abortion “increased
the early preterm delivery rate by 31.5%, with a yearly increase in initial neona-
tal hospital costs” of over “$1.2 billion . . . .  The yearly human cost includes
22,917 excess early preterm births . . . and 1,096 excess CP [cerebral palsy]
cases in very low-birth-weight newborns”) (quoting the abstract).
106. David C. Reardon et al., Deaths Associated with Abortion Compared to
Childbirth—A Review of New and Old Data and the Medical and Legal Implications, 20
J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 279, 281 (2004).
107. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
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right, let alone a constitutional one, to avoid the responsibilities
that arise from becoming a parent.  Along with the mother, a
father has legal duties toward his child from which he is not
excused even by asserting that the associated pregnancy was
unintended, unexpected, or unwanted.  That men have no right
to avoid the duties associated with fatherhood tends to under-
mine equality-based claims of an abortion right grounded in the
burdens of motherhood.108
Indeed, the abortion right, to the extent it claims to be
based on maternal burdens, seems to create gender inequality.
One female commenter has observed that those supporting an
abortion right based on maternal burdens “force themselves into
the unenviable position of arguing that behavior they find
indefensible in men [in not shouldering one’s duties as a parent]
is perfectly acceptable, even laudable, when practiced by
women.”109
One must also ask whether Roe’s depiction of women (but
not men) as being “taxed by child care,” the “distress . . . associ-
ated with the unwanted child,” and the “problem of bringing a
child into a family already unable, psychologically and otherwise,
to care for it” does not spring from an antiquated and paternalis-
tic view of women.  Abortion advocates themselves often lapse
into such rhetoric, sometimes to the point of misstating the facts
or the law.110  This is not to diminish the challenges of being a
parent, but only to say that those challenges are not exclusive to
one sex111 and give rise to no general right to avoid one’s respon-
sibility as a parent.
108. Cf. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992)
(plurality) (referring to the right of women “to participate equally in the eco-
nomic and social life of the Nation”); Stenberg v. Carhart (Carhart I), 530 U.S.
914, 920 (2000) (referring to the belief, among abortion proponents, that a law
forbidding abortion would deprive women of “equal liberty”); Gonzales v. Car-
hart (Carhart II), 550 U.S. 124, 172 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[L]egal
challenges to undue restrictions on abortion procedures . . . center on a
woman’s autonomy to determine her life’s course, and thus to enjoy equal citi-
zenship stature.”).
109. Rosemary Bottcher, Feminism: Bewitched by Abortion, in TO RESCUE THE
FUTURE 176 (Dave Andrusko ed., 1983).
110. One author claims that “[t]he state does not hold the pregnant
woman’s partner accountable for sharing the work of parenting . . . .”  Reva B.
Siegel, in WHAT Roe v. Wade Should Have Said: The Nation’s Top Legal Experts
Rewrite America’s Most Controversial Decision 77 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2005).  If
that is meant to be a claim about the law, it is mistaken. See also LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 102 (1990) (claiming, contrary to
biology, that an unborn child “begins as a living part of the woman’s body”).
111. By contrast, to the extent that any of the claimed burdens related to
pregnancy and childbirth are borne solely by women, men are not similarly
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More fundamentally—and returning to the constitutional
question—one finds no support in history or tradition to commit
an act of deadly violence against another human being, at any
stage of development, based on a claim that he or she is a “bur-
den,” even if he or she were uniquely a burden to either women
or men (which, after pregnancy, is not the case in the law).  On
the contrary, every available historical marker points to a tradi-
tion of government restraint of private acts of violence.  While
some claim a fundamental moral distinction between killing an
unborn child versus one that has been born, Anglo-American his-
tory points in the opposite direction, for the state has protected
unborn children from the very earliest traces of the common and
criminal law.112  There is certainly nothing in the historical
record to suggest that the Constitution forecloses a legislative judg-
ment that unborn children are entitled to the same protection
against deadly violence as is enjoyed by others.
III. DO THE CONSTITUTIONAL REASONS FOR REJECTING AN
ABORTION RIGHT OUTWEIGH THE STARE DECISIS REASONS FOR
ADHERING TO IT?
A. Stare Decisis
Casey’s lengthy consideration of stare decisis is puzzling.  The
authors of the joint opinion rely heavily on stare decisis, but with
no apparent embarrassment in rejecting much of Roe or cases
decided under it.  Though they claim to be upholding Roe’s “cen-
tral” holding by retaining the abortion right and viability rule,
Roe itself never characterized its holding in those terms.  As rec-
ognized by those Justices who would have overruled Roe in its
entirety, the portions of Roe that Casey overruled seem at least as
“central” as the part retained.  Seemingly unfazed and undeter-
red by stare decisis, the plurality abandoned the notion of abor-
tion as a fundamental right (the very reason, as we have seen, for
giving it substantive due process protection in the first place),
abandoned the rigorous test used to evaluate abortion regula-
tions, abandoned Roe’s constraints on regulations early in preg-
nancy, and explicitly overruled two cases that purported to apply
Roe.  This is as much an overruling as any, and the reader is left
to wonder why stare decisis should be so compelling a reason to
retain the abortion right while apparently too slender a reed to
situated, which would seem to foreclose any equality-based claim. See Bray v.
Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 270 (1993) (opposition to
abortion is not opposition to women).
112. See supra notes 68–84 and accompanying text.
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prevent other aspects of Roe from being (for the most part with-
out even discussion of stare decisis) jettisoned.
Thus, any discussion of the aims of stare decisis in the abor-
tion context has to confront at the outset the strange reality that,
while claiming to reaffirm, the Casey plurality in fact overruled
much of Roe.  Moreover, subsequent Supreme Court decisions
rejecting application of stare decisis in particular cases have not
always undertaken Casey’s elaborate analysis, but rest on analyti-
cal grounds that differ from Casey’s.113  Is it possible, in a princi-
pled way, to give stare decisis effect to Casey’s stare decisis rules
when those rules themselves have not been followed consistently
in later cases?
In any event, even if the Court were consistent in how it
understood and applied it, stare decisis is subject to several dis-
claimers and qualifications. Stare decisis is “not an inexorable
command,”114 the Court has long insisted, but simply reflects a
“policy judgment” that it is preferable “in most matters” that the
law be “settled than that it be settled right.”115  “Stare decisis is a
principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence
to the latest decision.”116  Relevant factors in deciding whether to
adhere to precedent include “the antiquity of the precedent”
and “whether the decision was well reasoned.”117  Another con-
sideration is whether “experience has pointed up the precedent’s
shortcomings.”118  Inconsistency among precedents counts in
favor of overruling.119  The policy of stare decisis “is at its weakest
when,” the Court writes, “we interpret the Constitution because
our interpretation can be altered only by constitutional amend-
ment or by overruling our prior decisions.”120  Accordingly, stare
113. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down a
state law banning sodomy, thereby overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986)).  Justice Scalia’s dissent in Lawrence points out the disparity between the
majority opinion in that case and the Casey plurality’s treatment of stare decisis.
114. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997) (quoting Payne v. Ten-
nessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991)).
115. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 235 (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co.,
285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)); Planned Parenthood of Se.
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (“[I]t is common wisdom that the rule of
stare decisis is not an ‘inexorable command,’ and certainly it is not such in every
constitutional case.”).
116. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 912 (2010)
(quoting Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940)).
117. Id. at 912 (quoting Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2088–89
(2009) (overruling Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986))).
118. Id.
119. Id. (noting such inconsistency in the Court’s decision to overrule
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990)).
120. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 235, and cases cited therein.
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decisis “has only a limited application in the field of constitutional
law.”121  Finally, the argument for adhering to prior case law is
diminished when “the precedent’s underlying reasoning has
become so discredited that the Court cannot keep the precedent
alive without jury-rigging new and different justifications to shore
up the original mistake.”122
The abortion right and viability rule fare poorly when
judged by these criteria. Roe settled little, if anything, legally or
politically.  Rather it unleashed social and political movements
and legislative reactions that continue to embroil the Court, lead-
ing to widespread perceptions of the Court as a political actor
and rendering it a target of ongoing political protests to this day.
Roe’s treatment of the legal history of abortion is seriously mis-
taken,123 and its reasoning has been roundly criticized by com-
mentators on both sides of the issue.124  Experience has only
pointed up Roe’s shortcomings; Roe and later abortion cases are
internally inconsistent and irreconcilable with each other, result-
ing in shifting rules on, and justifications for, an abortion
right.125  Abortion would seem to be a prime candidate for an
area of law in which the Court regularly engaged in “jury-rigging”
121. Id. (quoting St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38,
94 (1936) (Stone and Cardozo, JJ., concurring in result)).
122. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 921 (2010)
(Roberts, C.J., concurring) (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 817
(2009), and Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2088–89 (2009) (stare decisis
does not control when adherence to the prior decision requires “fundamentally
revising its theoretical basis”)).
123. See supra notes 68–84 and accompanying text.
124. See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Worst Constitutional Decision of
All Time, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 995, 1007 (2003) (“The result in Roe v. Wade
was, to put the matter simply and directly, not warranted by any plausible argu-
ment from constitutional text, structure, or history.”); Edward Lazarus, The Lin-
gering Problems with Roe v. Wade, and Why the Recent Senate Hearings on Michael
McConnell’s Nomination Only Underlined Them, FINDLAW (Oct. 3, 2002), http://
writ.news.findlaw.com/lazarus/20021003.html (“As a matter of constitutional
interpretation and judicial method, Roe borders on the indefensible.”); ALEXAN-
DER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 27–29 (1975) (“One is left to ask
why.  The Court never said.  It refused the discipline to which its function is
properly subject.  It simply asserted the result it reached.  This is all the Court
could do because moral philosophy, logic, reason, or other materials of law can
give no answer.”); Ely, supra note 55, at 935–36 (“What is frightening about Roe
is that this super-protected right is not inferable from the language of the Con-
stitution, the framers’ thinking respecting the specific problem in issue, any
general value derivable from the provisions they included, or the nation’s gov-
ernmental structure.”); Laurence H. Tribe, Forward: Toward a Model of Roles in
the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7 (1973) (“One of the most
curious things about Roe is that, behind its own verbal smokescreen, the sub-
stantive judgment on which it rests is nowhere to be found.”).
125. See supra notes 12–65 and accompanying text.
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to create “new and different justifications to shore up the origi-
nal mistake.”126
If the argument for retaining an abortion right is weak when
viewed merely through the lens of stare decisis, countervailing
considerations tip the balance even more decisively against the
right.  Unlike the non-binding and flexible “policy judgments”
characteristic of stare decisis, those countervailing considerations,
discussed in the next section, are firmly and inexorably rooted in
a constitutional text.
B. Countervailing Constitutional Considerations
The Constitution places a number of familiar and funda-
mental constraints on the power of the federal Judiciary.  These
constraints are not subject to a raft of exceptions or disclaimers.
First, the Constitution derives its authority only from the fact
that the People have consented to it, and the power that the Con-
stitution delegates is only that to which the People have con-
sented.127  When the Judiciary or any other branch of the federal
government purports to exercise some power not constitutionally
delegated to it, it violates the principle of consent that animates
the entire Constitution.  Such an undelegated exercise of power
fundamentally undermines the principle of self-government.
A second and related constitutional constraint is that powers
not expressly delegated to the federal government (meaning, of
course, any branch of the federal government)—that is, the vast
reservoir of law making and government power—are reserved “to
the States . . . or to the people.”128  When the Constitution is
silent, any delegation of power to the federal government is
foreclosed.
Third, powers expressly delegated to the Judiciary include
only judicial, as distinct from legislative and executive, powers.129
Because the Judiciary, like all branches of the federal govern-
ment, has only those powers expressly delegated to it,130 it fol-
lows that federal courts have no legislative power.131  Any
126. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 921 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
127. U.S. CONST. pmbl.  Unlike state governments, the federal govern-
ment has no general police power. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius,
132 S. Ct. 2566, 2578 (2012).
128. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
129. U.S. CONST. art. III.
130. U.S. CONST. art. III and amend. X.
131. See, e.g., Nw. Airlines v. Transp. Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 95
(1981) (“[W]e consistently have emphasized that the federal lawmaking power
is vested in the legislative, not the judicial branch of government . . . .”); Evans
v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 447 (1970) (“The responsibility of this Court . . . is to
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attempted exercise of legislative power would violate the doctrine
of separation of powers.  The animating purpose of that doctrine
is to prevent the amassing of power in any one branch of the
federal government.
Fourth, the Constitution sets out exclusive processes for
amending the Constitution.  Most obviously, the Judiciary has no
power to propose or adopt amendments to the Constitution.132
A judicial declaration of a “constitutional” right or duty not
found in, or fairly inferable from, the Constitution would, in
effect, be an attempt to amend the document in a manner not
prescribed by it.  Indeed, judges are “bound by Oath or Affirma-
tion, to support this Constitution,” meaning the written docu-
ment as amended from time to time in the constitutionally-
prescribed manner.133
The abortion right violates all these principles.  It is not
identified in the text of the Constitution or fairly inferable from
its provisions.  It does not satisfy the criteria that must be met to
qualify as a substantive right under the due process clause.  Lack-
ing such a relation to the Constitution, the assertion of a judi-
cially-crafted abortion right exceeds powers expressly granted to
the Judiciary, and invades powers expressly reserved to other
branches of the federal government to the extent of their consti-
tutionally-delegated powers and to the States.  Protecting the life
and health of one’s citizens—preventing deadly violence in par-
ticular—is within the well-recognized police power of the states, a
power that the states plainly did not surrender when they ratified
the Constitution.  A monopoly on deadly force (e.g., military
conflict) has been a distinguishing characteristic of modern gov-
ernment since at least the creation of the modern state.  The
only exception traditionally recognized at law has been defense
of oneself or others undertaken to prevent deadly violence.  There
is no historical or textual support for the claim that the Constitu-
tion, whose purposes include ensuring domestic tranquility and
the blessings of liberty to ourselves and “our posterity,” and
whose very text reserves vast police powers to the states, prevents
the states from preventing deadly violence by non-government
actors.  The Judiciary’s function is wholly subordinate to enacted
law, that is, the Constitution and Acts of Congress enacted in fur-
therance of the Constitution.  The Court has no comparable,
construe and enforce the Constitution and laws of the land as they are and not
to legislate social policy on the basis of our own personal inclinations.”); Stan-
ard v. Olesen, 74 S. Ct. 768, 771 (1954) (Douglas, J., writing as Circuit Justice)
(“[I]t is for Congress, not the courts, to write the law.”).
132. U.S. CONST. art. V.
133. U.S. CONST. art. VI (emphasis added).
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inexorable constitutional duty to follow its own prior decisions,
as is apparent from the countless occasions on which the Court
has overruled itself.  Judicial decisions, by their nature, do not
have the force of constitutional text, a text the Court has no
power to amend.
When the general considerations, discussed in the preceding
section, for adhering to prior cases are placed on one side of a
ledger, and the constitutional reasons for overruling, discussed in
this section, are placed on the other side, there seems to be little
contest.  Constitutionally-grounded principles of limited, demo-
cratic government; separation of powers and the delegated
duties of the Judiciary; the preservation of state governments and
the reservation to them of powers not expressly delegated to the
federal government; the duty of all judicial and other officers to
support the Constitution; the notion of a written Constitution
and the Judiciary’s lack of power to amend it—no one would dis-
pute that these are, in every sense, fundamental commands.  It
does not take any great leap to conclude that these considera-
tions, which are essential to the structure of American govern-
ment, are of much greater weight than the mere “policy
judgments” to retain a rule of law announced in a previous
case.134
IV. DO CONSIDERATIONS OF INSTITUTIONAL INTEGRITY FAVOR
RETENTION OF AN ABORTION RIGHT?
In light of what has been said thus far, the question posed in
the title of this section virtually answers itself.  The Court’s abor-
tion decisions have reflected, and continue to reflect, inconsis-
tent, seemingly ad hoc rules and outcomes.  This fluctuating
abortion right has no basis in history or tradition, as would be
necessary to rank it as fundamental and thereby subject to the
protection of substantive due process, and the Court no longer
makes that claim for it.  The abortion right has undermined mar-
134. Cf., e.g., Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerk’s Union, 398 U.S. 235, 241
(1970) (noting that stare decisis is an inadequate reason to adhere to precedent
when adherence “involves collision with a prior doctrine more embracing in its
scope, intrinsically sounder, and verified by experience”) (quoting Helvering v.
Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940)); EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 249–50
(1983) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“I think it so plain that [a particular prior
decision] not only was incorrectly decided, but also is inconsistent with the cen-
tral purpose of the Constitution itself, that it is not entitled to the deference
that the doctrine of stare decisis ordinarily commands for this Court’s prece-
dents.”).  In addition, the abortion right is in tension with constitutional inter-
ests that enjoy explicit or implicit constitutional protection. See supra notes
85–93 and accompanying text.
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ital and parental interests that are both deeply rooted in the
nation’s history and traditions and have been regularly ranked as
fundamental.  It has had a disturbing ripple effect on rights of
conscience and has been invoked to support other forms of kill-
ing, such as aid in committing suicide.  The problems and bur-
dens of pregnancy and parenthood, which Roe addressed only in
the most cursory fashion, would seem peculiarly within the prov-
ince of the political branches, and there is no reason to think
that the Court has any special expertise or competence in this
area.  The principle of stare decisis, invoked by Casey to reaffirm an
abortion right, is not a principle to which the Court has adhered
in its abortion cases, and Casey’s particular explication of that
principle has not been followed consistently in subsequent case
law.  Finally and most fundamentally, the Court’s declaration of a
constitutionally-based abortion right outstrips the designated
role that the Constitution gives to the federal government and to
federal courts in particular.
Under these circumstances, Casey’s concern about institu-
tional integrity and the public perception of the Court135 favor
rejection rather than reaffirmation of an abortion right.  Far
from undermining the public’s perception of the Court, rejection
of an abortion right that purports to be based in the Constitution
would serve as an important corrective in the public’s understand-
ing of the constitutionally-defined role that the Court plays in
our government.  It would appropriately restore to the People, as
it should, the responsibility for making difficult policy decisions
about abortion.  Considerations of institutional integrity have
generally not prevented the Court, when convinced of past error,
from overruling its previous decisions in other contexts.  In a
matter of such grave consequence as abortion, a genuine con-
cern for institutional integrity weighs in favor of judicial repudia-
tion, and not reaffirmation, of an abortion right.
135. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 864–69
(1992).
